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PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
The parties to this Appeal are the Plaintiff/Appellant, Bonnie
Kay Harris, and the Defendant/Appellee, Theresa Gutierrez Spivey,
aka Theresa Spivey.
Also named as defendants in the case at the trial court level
were Utah Retirement Systems and the Estate of Glendon G. Spivey,
deceased. Neither of those defendants submitted anything in the
trial court proceedings or this appeal, except the Utah Retirement
Systems submitted a Stipulation signed by all parties named in the
trial court case and an order was signed by the Utah Court of
Appeals

dated

21

February,

1996,

Retirement Systems from the appeal.

1

formally

dismissing

Utah
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JURISDICTION
Appellate jurisdiction is vested in the Utah Court of Appeals
pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-2a-3(2) (i), Utah Code Ann.
1953, as amended.
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V
ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented by this appeal are as follows:
Issues of Law:
1.

Did the trial court err in concluding that the necessary

elements were present in this case so that Mrs. Harris1 Petition
was barred by the doctrine of laches?
2.

Did the trial court err in concluding that the necessary

elements were present in this case so that Mrs. Harris' Petition
was barred by the doctrine of res judicata?
3.

Did the trial court err in concluding that Mrs. Harris

had not shown a substantial change in her circumstances since the
Divorce Decree had been entered?
Standard of Review for Issues of Fact:
A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard. Alta Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282,
1286 (Utah 1993); Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.
2d 1141, 1147 (Utah App. 1994); Mostrona v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573,
577 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied, -P.2d- (Utah 1994); Cremins v.
Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981); Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150
(Utah 1981).
Standard of Review for Issues of Law:
A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed
for correctness which is also referred to as a "correction of error
standard."

United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co.,

870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); Jacobsen Inv. Co. v. State Tax
6

Commission, 839 P.2d 789, 790 (Utah 1992).
VI
DETERMINATIVE CA8ES
Cases

Page No.

Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990)
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121
(Utah App. 1988)
VII
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(A)
NATURE OF THE CASE
Fifteen years after divorce and three months after the death
of the husband

(Glendon 6. Spivey), the ex-wife

(Appellant-

Plaintiff, Bonnie Harris) filed a petition in this action (District
Court

Civil

No.

9544400677)

against

the

second

wife,

Appellee/Defendant, Theresa Spivey, to modify the property division
in the decree in prior divorce action (District Court Civil No.
53,289) which was entered in 1980, to obtain retirement benefits of
the deceased husband. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss
filed

by the deceased husband's second wife, Theresa Gutierrez

Spivey. The ex-wife, Plaintiff-Bonnie Harris
trial court's ruling. Appellee/Defendant,

has appealed the

Theresa Spivey, has

cross-appealed the issue of the trial court denying her request for
attorney fees.

7

(B)
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Pleading Description

Filed Date Filed By Record No.

1. Petition to Modify Divorce Decree

03/31/95

Plaintiff

R.7

04/24/95

Plaintiff

R.10

05/01/95

Def/Spivey

R.21

05/01/95

Def/Spivey

R.38

05/01/95

Def/Spivey

R.46

05/01/95

Def/Spivey

R.18

05/08/95

Plaintiff

R.53

05/14/95

Plaintiff

R.142

05/15/95

Def/Spivey

R.58

2. Summons served 4/10/95 on Theresa
6. Spivey.
3. Motion to Dismiss Petition to
Modify Divorce
4. Memorandum of Points and Authorethos in Support of Theresa 6.
Spivey*s Motion to Dismiss
5. Affidavit of Theresa G. Spivey
in Support of Motion to Dismiss
6. Motion to have case assigned to
Judge Park
7. Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion to Have Case assigned
to Judge Park
8. Memorandum in Opposition to
Theresa G. Spivey"s Motion
to Dismiss
9. Reply to Memorandum in Opposition
to have Case Assigned to Judge
Park
10.Affidavit of Vernon L. Snow in
Support of Motion to Assign case
0515/95
to Judge Park
8

Def/Spivey

R.61

11.Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum
in Opposition to Dismiss Petition
to Modify Divorce Decree

05/19/95 Def/Spivey

R.84

12.Minute Entry-matter certified to
the Honorable Anthony W. Schofield 05/22/95 Court

R.84

13.Affidavit in Support of Petition
to Modify Divorce Decree

05/24/95 Plaintiff

R/96

06/02/95 Def/Spivey

R.100

06/07/95 Plaintiff

R.108

06/16/95 Plaintiff

R.122

17.Objection to Unauthorized Filings

06/19/95 Def/Spivey

R.155

18.Ruling of Judge Schofield

06/20/95 Court

R.153

19.Order of Dismissal

07/20/95 Def/Spivey

R.160

20.Affidavit of Impecuniosity

08/16/95 Plaintiff

R.162

21.Notice of Appeal

08/17/95 Plaintiff

R.164

22.Notice of Cross Appeal

09/29/95 Def/Spivey

R.169

14.Notice to Submit for DecisionMotion to Dismiss Petition to
Modify Divorce Decree
15.Transcript in Support of Petition
to Modify Divorce Decree
16.Documentation in Support of
Petition to Modify Divorce
Decree

C. DISPOSITION OF CASE AT TRIAL LEVEL
The trial court dismissed the Petition to Modify Divorce
Decree finding:
1. Laches bars litigation concerning the distribution of the
retirement benefits as is more fully set forth in the court's
9

Ruling dated June 20, 1995. (R.160, 153.)
2. Res judicata bars litigation concerning the distribution of
the retirement benefits as more fully set forth in the court's
Ruling dated June 20, 1995. (R.160,153.)
3. A divorce decree cannot be modified in a separate

action

brought after the death of one of the spouses as is more fully set
forth in the court's Ruling dated June 20, 1995, (R.160. 153.)
4. An award of attorney fees to Defendant/Theresa Spivey was
denied. (R.160,153.)

dated June 20, 1995. (R.160, 153.)

D. STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.
decedent)

Glendon G. Spivey (sometimes hereafter referred to as
and

Plaintiff-Bonnie

Harris

were

married

May

5,

1962.(R.6#8.)
2.

Plaintiff-Harris and decedent were divorced May 15, 1980,

in case no. 53,289, District Court of Utah County, State of Utah.
The decree of divorce was granted after a trial in which both
plaintiff and Glendon G. Spivey were represented by counsel.
Plaintiff was represented by Brent D. Young, Attorney. (R.1,2,3,6.)
Decedent was represented by attorney Thomas Taylor. (R.22.)
3.

Financial Declarations were filed in the original divorce

action by Plaintiff (R.27-24.), and Glendon G. Spivey. (R. 24-22.)
4.

The divorce decree entered May 15, 1980, is silent as to

any distribution of retirement funds or 401k or 457 plans. (R.3.)
5.

Subsequent to the divorce Plaintiff-Bonnie Harris married

Craig J. Harris on November 7, 1982. (R.45.) Glendon G. Spivey (now
deceased) married Defendant- Theresa Gutierrez on November 27,
10

1982.(R.45.)
6.

A son, Wade, was born to Glendon Spivey and Defendant-

Theresa G. Spivey on May 7, 1985. (R.45.)
7.

During the marriage between plaintiff and Glendon G.

Spivey the plaint iff-Bonnie Harris worked for Signet ics. Glendon G.
Spivey worked for Provo City. (R.45 #2 and 3.)
8.

According to the records of the Utah State Retirement

Office, Glendon G. Spivey retired October 16, 1991, as an employee
of the City of Provo. (R.39,40,41,44.)
9.

In

1990

and

1991,

Glendon

G.

Spivey

changed

the

beneficiaries on his retirement and 401K retirement plan. (R.39-42.)
10.

Glendon G. Spivey died on December 27, 1994, leaving as

his surviving widow, Theresa Spivey (Appellee-Defendant), his wife
of 12 years,
the

and their son, Wade, then nine years of age who are

beneficiaries

of

his retirement

benefit

and

his

4 OIK

plan.(R.44 #9,and 39,40,41,44.)
11.

Defendant-Spivey and her son Wade Spivey are dependent on

the monthly income received as beneficiaries of decedent-Glendon G.
Spivey1s retirement pension and 401K plan to meet current and
future health, welfare, education and living expenses, and will be
seriously adversely affected should the pension and 401K plan be
reduced or eliminated. (R.44 #13.)
12.

On December 29, 1994, Lisa Ann Spivey, daughter of the

decedent from his marriage to Plaintiff-Harris signed a petition to
have herself appointed Personal Representative in the Probate of
Decedent's Estate. The petition was prepared by Charles A. Schultz,
11

the same attorney representing Plaintiff-Harris ((R.73.)
13• On December 30, 1994, the foregoing petition to have Lisa
Spivey appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of Glendon
G. spivey, deceased, was filed with the court almost two hours
before the decedent's funeral. (Utah County case No. 943400572. (R.
76,60,44#10.)
14. On January 11, 1995, Appellee/Defendant-Theresa Spivey
filed a Counter-Petition in the probate proceeding. Sidney S.
Gilbert was subsequently appointed Personal representative of the
Estate of Glendon G. Spivey, deceased on stipulation. (R.44.)
15.

On March 31, 1995, fifteen years after the divorce

between Plaintiff and Glendon G. Spivey, and three months after
Glendon1s death, Plaintiff filed this separate action, case no.
954400677DA, seeking to modify the divorce decree dated May 15,
1980, in case no. 53,289. (R.7.)
16. Lisa Spivey, daughter of Plaintiff-Harris,

is not only

the original Petitioner in the probate case, but appears to be the
secretary or assistant of Charles A. Schultz, the attorney for both
Lisa Spivey and also Plaintiff-Harris. (R.60#4,75, and see various
certificates of service of Appellant/Plaintiff-Harris.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree should be dismissed
because:
1. Glendon Spivey, a necessary party to modify the divorce is
dead.
2. Any modification of a divorce decree must be done in the
12

original proceeding and not in this, a separate proceeding.
3. The original divorce decree is res judicata as to the
ownership of the retirement funds and 401k plan under the holding
in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988).
4. Laches bar this suit 15 years after the divorce decree.
5. Attorney fees should be imposed against Plaintiff.
ARGUMENT
I,THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT APPELLANT-BONNIE
HARRIS' PETITION TO MODIFY DIVORCE DECREE WAS BARRED BY THE
DOCTRINE OF LACHES.
Judge Schofield succinctly sets forth the law of laches and
its application in this case when he states at pages 3,4, and 5 of
his ruling dated June 20, 1995, as follows: (R.151.)
"•••Although few cases are resolved on the basis of laches,
this is that unusual case where laches should apply.
For laches to bar a claim two elements must exist.
1.
The lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff, and
2.
An injury to defendant owing to such lack of
diligence. Papanikolas Bros, Enters. v. Suaarhouse
Shopping Center, 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975)
Lack of diligence on the part of Bonnie seems obvious.
She was divorced from Glendon in 1980. In Woodward v.
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), the Supreme Court first
ruled that retirement benefits are subject to division in a
divorce action. That case was decided only two years after the
divorce between Bonnie and Glendon and twelve years before his
death. During that intervening twelve years Bonnie had ample
time to bring any action she desired to determine any claim
which she may have to Glendon's retirement benefits.
Glendon and Theresa married in 1982, over twelve years
before his death* During that intervening twelve years Bonnie
surely must have wondered what retirement benefits Theresa may
have from Glendon and what, if any, benefits she was entitled
to from Glendon's retirement.
13

Further, Glendon retired in October 1991, over three
years before his death and three and one-half years before
Bonnie brought this modification petition. By that time it
must have been clear that Glendon was receiving some of his
retirement benefits and that she was not. Again, Bonnie had
ample time to bring an action to determine her claim to his
retirement benefits.
These separate measures of the lack of diligence by
Bonnie are persuasive. She did not act timely to assert her
rights. Further, the prejudice to Theresa arising from
Bonnie's delay also is clear.
The decision of whether Bonnie or Theresa is entitled to
Glendon*s retirement benefit is based, at least in part, upon
Glendon1s decision made in December 1990 to change the
beneficiary of his retirement plan, naming Theresa. His
intent, decision and actions all are relevant and yet Glendon
is not available to testify. He is deceased. His absence is
complete and unavoidable. Had this action been instituted
while he was alive, during any of the fifteen years that
passed after the entry of the decree and his death, during any
of the twelve years that passed after the Woodward decision
and his death, during any of the twelve years after Theresa
and Glendon married and his death, or even during the three
years after his retirement and his death, he could have
participated in the litigation. Now his participation is
forever lost.
Notwithstanding Bonnie's weak assertion to the contrary,
for her to bring this action now, after Glendon had died
places Theresa at a material and substantial disadvantage, a
disadvantage that could have been avoided had Bonnie moved
timely. That is the kind of prejudicial delay that a laches
defense is all about. Bonnie has slept on her rights for at
least three years, more likely twelve or fifteen years. She
could have brought this action when a now unavailable,
critical witness still was alive.(Footnote omitted.)
This is the appropriate case for a laches defense. Bonnie
had ample time to raise the issue she now raises only after
Glendon's death. Theresa is in a changed position because of
her marriage to Glendon, because of his retirement and because
of his subsequent death. To permit litigation at this late
date would be to her significant prejudice. Laches bars this
action."
24 Am Jur 2d states in Section 492, at page 521:
"The party seeking to set aside a divorce decree may
be barred by laches where he has been guilty of a lack of
diligence in learning the facts or in seeking relief and
14

innocent third persons have acquired rights by or through
the remarriage of the other spouse in the meantime.
Plaintiff knew where Glendon worked. She had legal counsel in
the divorce proceeding. A trial was held. All of the facts were
available to her and her counsel.

She knew Glendon had retired,

yet she did nothing for 15 years.

In the meantime, Glendon died

and innocent persons- Theresa Spivey and Glendon and Theresa's son,
Wade, will be adversely affected by Plaintiff's action.

All the

elements of laches exist, namely, (1) lack of diligence by the
plaintiff against whom the defense is asserted and (2) prejudice to
the party asserting the defense. P.P.I.e. vs. C. Goldy Limousine,
810 P Supp 1124, 1127 (D. Col 1993); Clark vs. Chipman, 212 Kan
259, 510 P.2d 1257, 1266 (Kansas 1973).
II.THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT
Plaintiff-HARRIS' PETITION WAS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES
JUDICATA

(THROCKMORTON

V,

THROCKMORTON,

767

P. 2d

121

(UTAH

APP.1988).
The present case involves a very similar factual situation and
the same legal issues as Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, supra, which
was decided by this court in 1988.
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, supra, involved a petition to
modify a divorce decree filed by a former wife who had been married
21 years to the husband. Throckmorton's had eight children.

Mr.

Throckmorton was a policeman. Mrs. Throckmorton did not work
outside the home. (Plaintiff in the instant case worked outside the
home for Signetics.) Ten years after the Throckmorton divorce Mrs.
Throckmorton filed a petition in the divorce case seeking increased
15

alimony and a share of Mr. Throckmorton's retirement benefits.
At page 122 of Throckmorton, supra, this Court stated:
The trial court further held Mrs. Throckmorton's claim
to her former husband's retirement benefits was barred by
the doctrine of res judicata.
This court in Throckmorton, supra, at page 123 discussed
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mrs.
Throckmorton's claim to Mr. Throckmorton's retirement benefits
stating:
The doctrine of res judicata applies in divorce
actions. Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303,305(Utah
1985)• 'When there has been an adjudication, it becomes
res judicata as to those issues which were either tried
and determined, or upon all issues which the party had a
fair opportunity to present and have determined in the
other proceeding.'... However, the application of res
judicata is unique in divorce actions because of the
equitable doctrine which allows courts to reopen alimony,
support, or property distributions if the moving party
can demonstrate a substantial change of circumstances
since the matter was previously considered by the
court....
We must determine whether the subsequent legal
recognition of retirement benefits as marital property
subject to distribution in a divorce case is a
substantial change of circumstances, thereby precluding
the application of res judicata. Or more specifically,
whether Woodward should be given retroactive effect."
(Emphasis added.)
The

Court in Throckmorton. supra, then examined a similar

factual case in Arizona, Guffev v. LaChance, 127 Ariz 140, 618 P.
2d 634 (Ariz Ct App. 1980) • In Guffey, supra, a wife sought to
modify a seven and-one-half-year-old divorce decree in order to
share in her former husband's military retirement benefits. The
Utah court went on to say in Throckmorton at page 124:
••.Nonetheless, the court(Arizona) denied the wife's
request to modify, stating, '(t)here is a compelling
16

policy interest favoring the finality of property
settlement' and this policy would be "greatly undermined
if the court were to allow the potential for
reexamination of every military divorce prior to the
enactment of the rule'.. •
•••We agree with the Arizona Court of Appeals, and find
that legal recognition of a new category of property
rights after a divorce decree has been entered is not
itself sufficient to establish a substantial change of
circumstances justifying a re-evaluation of a prior
property division. Thus, we hold that the legal
principles articulated in Woodward, should only be given
prospective application. (Emphasis added.)
Later this Court revisited the question of retirement benefits
in Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990) following and
referring to Throckmorton, supra, stating at pages 716-717:
Our opinion noted that res judicata 'is unique in
divorce actions because of the equitable doctrine which
allows courts to reopen alimony, support, or property
distributions if the moving party can demonstrate a
substantial change of circumstances since the matter was
previously considered by the court.1 ... We noted that
pension benefits were first recognized as marital assets
in Utah in Woodward v Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982)
('Woodward I 1 ) . Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 123. We then
addressed the issue whether Woodward I should be given
retroactive effect. Id. We ultimately determined that
'legal recognition of a new category of property rights
after a divorce decree has been entered, is not itself
sufficient to establish a substantial change of
circumstances justifying a reevaluation of the prior
property division." Id at 124)"
"In the instant case, appellant has articulated no
change of circumstance justifying a reevaluation of the
original property division. Appellant's claim of lack of
knowledge of the retirement benefits does not constitute
such a change. The only other possible change of
circumstance is Woodward I's legal recognition of
retirement benefits as marital assets. However, the
decree of divorce was entered more than four years before
the issuance of Woodward I and the modification order was
entered a year before the issuance of Throckmorton.
Inasmuch as Woodward I is to be given prospective
application only, there is no appropriate basis on which
to divide respondent's retirement account. Rather, we
find the 'policy interest favoring the finality of
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property settlement1 to be compelling. (Emphasis added.)
The divorce decree in this case was rendered 8 years before
Throckmorton, and

15 years before Plaintiff-Harris

filed her

Petition to Modify Decree. It was not a default or fraudulent
divorce. Both parties were represented by counsel. The facts and
the law as it then existed and the rights of each party were known
and available to each party. A trial was held. The issues were
litigated or could have been litigated. Res judicata bars the
Plaintiff's petition to modify and the trial court so held..
Plaintiff-Harris misperceived and misapplies the broad concept
of privity as it might apply to this case. A simple perusal of
Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, West Publishing Co. 1951,
page 1361 defines privity as follows:
PRIVITY. Mutual or successive relationship to the same rights
of property.... Thus, the executor is in privity with the
testator, the heir with the ancestor, the assignee with the
assignor, the donee with the donor, and the lessee with the
lessor.••
Glendon gave-assigned all of his rights to the retirement and
401K plans to Theresa Spivey when he made her his beneficiary.
(R.39-42.)

Theresa is in privity with Glendon. She meets all of

the requirements of Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah App.
1978) and Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (Utah 1943).
The court in Tanner v. Bacon, supra, states beginning at page 959:
It is well settled that the doctrine of res adjudicata
does not operate to affect strangers to a judgment; that it
only affects the parties and their successors in interest, and
those who are in privity with a party thereto.••.This court
has defined the word "privity11 as a mutual or successive
relationship to the same right or property. As applied to
judgments or decrees of courts, the word means one whose
interest has been legally represented at the time.(Emphasis
18

added•)
This Court stated on the doctrine of res judicata in Trimble
Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451 (Utah App. 1988) at
page 453 as follows:
The doctrine of res judicata has two separate but related
branches which can be asserted as affirmative defenses... The
first branch, now known as claim preclusion but referred to
previously as "pure" res judicata, bars the relitigation by
the parties or their privies of a claim for relief previously
resolved by a final judgment on the merits...."The same rule
also prevents relitigation of claims that could and should
have been litigated in the prior action but were not."...
The second branch of res judicata is collateral estoppel,
or issues preclusion. Under this doctrine, the relitigation of
factual issues that have one been litigated and decided is
precluded even if the claims for relief in the two actions are
different, • • • and even if only "the party against whom the
doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to
the prior adjudication...." (Emphasis added.)
Clearly in the context of those pronouncements, Theresa Spivey
is the successor
property

to Glendon's

interest. The divorce settled

interests of the parties. The court

has

spoken in

Throckmorton that Woodward would only be applied prospectively in
cases. Res judicata

does apply in the present case.

Plaintiff-Harris cites Carpenter v. Carpenter. 722 P 2d 230,
150 Ariz. 52 (Ariz. 1986), in support of her claim that an ex-wife
is entitled to pension benefits. That case is not applicable to the
present case because Arizona is a community property state. The
court in Carpenter,supra, only modified the decree in that case
because of the property of the spouses was community property and
the wife had a community property interest at the time of the
divorce. Utah is not

a community property state.

19

III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED AS A MATTER OF LAW
THAT A DIVORCE DECREE CANNOT BE MODIFIED AFTER THE DEATH OF ONE OF
THE SPOUSES.
Judge Schofield's Ruling at R. 147 states:
While at first blush this point should be axiomatic, it
merits fuller explanation.
A divorce decree settles the rights of the two divorcing
parties. In this case Bonnie and Glendon were divorced in May
1980, some fifteen years before this modification proceeding
was brought. At that time their respective interests in
marital assets were determined. Now Bonnie asks that this
Court modify that aged divorce decree. Yet, one of the parties
is not present, nor can he be present as he died three months
before the filing of this action. His property rights were
fixed when he died. If Bonnie had any claim against him, it
now would be a claim against his estate, not a claim to modify
the divorce decree. Yet here she is asking this Court to
ignore the fact of his death and determine the rights which
she and Glendon have concerning a retirement benefit which
accrued, if at all during a marriage which terminated fifteen
years ago.
Farrell v. Porter. 830 P.2d 299,301 (Utah App. 1992),
quoted with approval from the older case of Nelson v. Davis,
592 P.2d 594,597 (Utah 1979):
When the death of one or both parties to a divorce action
occurs during the pendency of the action, the action
itself abates and their status, including their property
rights, reverts to what it had been before the action was
filed.
If that language is accurate, then the death of Glendon
abates any divorce modification proceeding. The rights of the
parties thus are fixed at the status prior to the death. At
that time Bonnie had no enunciated rights in Glendon*s
retirement. I see no reason she should have any now.
This case is different from Farrell as in Farrell the
divorce was in process when Mr. Farrell died in a fishing boat
accident while in this case Glendon's death occurred well
before Bonnie brought her petition to modify. If Farrell and
Nelson have meaning, it is that as between divorcing parties,
property rights are fixed at the time of death and divorce
cannot change or modify the effect of death in fixing property
rights. If that is so in Farrell, it is more so in this case
as Bonnie brought this action well after Glendon's death. Any
20

property rights which she may have had in common with Glendon
were fixed and would need to be decided in the context of a
probate of his estate, not by resort to a modification of the
old divorce decree. (Footnote omitted.)
The general rule is that an application to vacate a decree of
divorce does not lie after the death of a party.

There is a

conflict of authority upon questions of whether a divorce decree
can be vacated after the death of a party where property rights are
involved. Property

interests, within the foregoing rule, are

interests the surviving spouse has been wrongfully deprived by the
divorce, 24 Am Jur 2d

Divorce and Separation, Section 494.

The present Spivey case would not qualify, even if Utah courts
followed jurisdictions which allowed property interests to be
considered after death of a party because there is no fraud, none
was alleged in the Petition to Modify Divorce Decree (R.8.), nor
was this a default. Both parties were represented by counsel and a
trial held. Further, if a modification of a divorce decree were
done, it would have to be done in the same case rather than in a
separate case. Karren v. Karren, 25 Utah 87, 69 P 465 (Utah 1902).
With Glendon's death the court in the original divorce proceeding
lost jurisdiction over him.
IV. APPELLANT-HARRIS1 PETITION DID NOT ALLEGE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES
To modify a divorce decree the moving party must allege in the
pleadings and prove changed conditions arising since the entry of
the decree.Gale v. Gale, 123 Utah 277, 258 P.2d 986 (Utah 1953),
which cites Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah 216, 198 P.2d 233 (Utah 1948).
Plaintiff-

Harris1

Petition

to

Modify

is

void

of

any

allegation of substantial changed circumstances. (R. 8) It merely
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states

that

the

original

Divorce

court

Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Decree did not address the issue of
retirement or 4OIK plans.
State and Federal Statutes also indicate the Petition to
Modify is without merit and lacks substance.
A. STATE STATUTES:
Glendon Spivey was a retired employee of the City of Provo and
a member of the Utah State Retirement System. Benefits of members
of that retirement system are governed and controlled by the Utah
Retirement Act. (Utah Statutes Section 49-1-103(15).)
Utah Code Section 49-1-606(1) states who are

beneficiaries.

It reads:
(1) If a member marries or remarries. all beneficiary
designations dated prior to the most recent marriage and
filed with the retirement office shall be canceled and
the spouse shall be the beneficiary unless a different
beneficiary designation is executed on or after the date
of the marriage and filed with the retirement office, in
which case the designation of beneficiary shall be
binding in the payment of any benefits which may be due
under this title. (Emphasis added.)
Theresa Spivey is the beneficiary of Glendon G. Spivey1s
retirement and 401(k) plan benefits in two ways.
First. Theresa is the beneficiary because Glendon G. Spivey
designated her as the beneficiary by executing beneficiary forms on
in 1990, and 1991.(R.41,42.)
SECOND.

Even

without

the

execution

of

the

beneficiary

designation forms, Theresa G. Spivey is the beneficiary because all
prior executed designations were canceled under Utah Code 49-1606(1), and as Glendon's spouse she is the beneficiary.
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B. FEDERAL STATUTES:
Although Glendon's 401(k) plan is administered by the Utah
State Retirement Office, Federal Law controls how such plans
operate. The Utah State Retirement Office Beneficiary Change Form
Glendon signed contains the following wording. (R.42.)
401 (k) DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN: In compliance with the

National Retirement Equity act of 1984, if you are married,
your primary beneficiary MUST be your spouse unless you
provide us with a NOTARIZED written consent from your spouse
authorizing another beneficiary and waiving any claim to the
benefits of this program. (R.42. A Clearer copy of R.42 is
attached to this brief as Addendum 1.)
Bonnie-Harris1 affidavit of having poor health 10 or 15 years
after a divorce is without merit, and was not part of the pleading.
She remarried two years after the divorce. Support is alimony and
alimony ends after remarriage. Her present husband is the one
Plaintiff needs to look to for support. A change in health 10 and
15 years after a divorce is not a change of circumstances to
justify a modification of a property division in a divorce action
where Plaint iff-Harris was represented by counsel and a trial held.
Two

following

hypothetical

examples

illustrate

the

impracticality of subsequent poor health 10 and 15 years later
justifying

modifying

a

prior

divorce

property

settlement,

especially where the other spouse is now dead. Chaos in the courts
would result. Every healthy party in a divorce who at some later
date in life suffered a decline in health would be back in court
seeking to modify the court property division. Divorce cases would
never end.
Hypothetical No. 1. The parties divorce. The husband-spouse in
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the divorce dies. Fifty years later the other spouse develops poor
health and files an action against the second wife to modify the
divorce property division.
Hypothetical No. 2. The movie star Elizabeth Taylor has,
according to some press reports, been married 8 times to 6 or 7
husbands. Other press reports state that Elizabeth has had poor
health and been to medical centers for treatment. Could Elizabeth
Taylor, now in her 60's expect the court to modify the property
distribution in her first divorce which occurred 40 years ago while
she was in her teens? What about the intervening husbands, and the
style of living Elizabeth Taylor has followed in the intervening
years? Are all of those divorces subject to being reopened and
property distributions modified?
Glendon Spivey was not the guarantor of Plaintiff-Harris1
health 8 and 15 years after the divorce.
The

trial

court

weighed

the

matter

of

any

change

of

circumstances. Judge Schofield states at page 6 of his Ruling:
...A property distribution was made fifteen years ago and no
compelling circumstances are alleged which justify reopening
that property distribution. (R.148)
CONCLUSION
A trial court's Ruling and Order dismissing the Petition to
Modify Divorce Decree is well supported by the facts and the law.
This court should affirm that holding.
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CROSS-APPEAL ON ATTORNEY FEES
Defendant Theresa G. Spivey should be awarded attorney fees
under Rule 11, Sanctions and Utah Code 78-27-56.
The court should be aware of some background matters which the
record reflects to put this case in focus.
1. Glendon 6. Spivey died December 27, 1994. (R. 3#13.)
2. On December 29, 1994, two days after his death, Lisa
Spivey, a daughter of decedent and Appellant-Bonnie Harris signed
a petition to have herself appointed personal representative of
Glendon• s estate. That petition was filed in the Fourth District
Court, Utah County in probate case No. 943400572 on December 30,
1994, about two hours before her father- Glendon Spivey's funeral.
(R. 76, 44#10.)
3. On January 11, 1995, Defendant-Theresa Spivey filed a
counter-petition to have herself appointed personal representative.
(R. 44#12.)
4. Sidney S. Gilbert, CPA, was subsequently named personal
representative by stipulation. (R. 44#12.)
5. On March 31, 1995, 3 months after Glendon Spivey1s death
and 15 years after the divorce with Glendon, Plaintiff-Harris filed
the present case to modify the divorce decree. (R. 6.) Who is the
attorney for Appellant/Defendant-Bonnie Harris? It is Charles A.
Schultz, who is also attorney for Lisa Spivey in the probate
proceeding. Who is the person signing many of the certificates of
delivery in the present case? It is the same Lisa Spivey who filed
25

the probate proceeding even before her father's funeral.
There appears to be a vendetta against Theresa Spivey, the
surviving wife, attempting to get Glendon Spivey's assets which are
needed by her and Wade, the

young son of decedent and herself.

Items I through III above (Items 1 through VI of the Theresa
Spivey's Memorandum to Dismiss) clearly show Plaintiff's action is
without merit. It was brought without good faith, and is an obvious
effort by Plaintiff's counsel, who is also counsel for the children
from decedent's first marriage, to harass and increase attorney
fees of Theresa Spivey.

Defendant, Theresa. 6. Spivey, should be

awarded attorney fees for defending this action under Utah Code 7827-56 and Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
CONCLUSION ON CROSS-APPEAL
That portion of the trial court Ruling and Order which denied
Theresa Spivey her attorney fees should be reversed. She should be
awarded her attorney fees.

Dated this 28th day of April, 1996.

l^U^f-?<L

M. DAYLE JEFFS /
///
Attorney for Defendant
Theresa 6. Spivey

VERNON L. SNOW
Attorney for Defendant
Theresa 6. Spivey

26

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
I hereby certify that the original and seven copies of the
Brief of Appellee Theresa 6. Spivey was delivered to the Court of
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102, and two copies delivered to the below named parties by
delivery of by placing the same in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, this

29th day of April, 1996, addressed as follows:

CHARLES A. SCHULTZ
Attorney at Law
P.O. BOX 526382
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-6382
SIDNEY S. GILBERT, C.P.A.
190 West 800 North
Provo, Utah 84601
(Delivered)

)
/
/ /
VERNON L. SNOW

27

A D D E N D U M

S*ft Lake Oiy. Utah O'U1
(001) 355 3864
1. f\*

INSTRUCTIONS:

2
3
4

for Maine, Add

nanio and address charvges. complete only Section A urvtess you dos*o lo dosiynalo your

Sections A and 0 must bo c o n d o l e d wher
7IMS form MUST BE completely fillod out and *ty|>/"/\ p^tjip^jottoin m order to bo processod.
Ptoaso tyj>o or print clearly m ink. DO NOT t'«

it

HIT, timet:

SECIIOM A - rensott/tt. wirorwiAHOM
Soc Soc No

and Bonoflclary Changes

N,W?KJ (L<*ltJ nit.

M

MA**»

NotRmrtJd

_U!L &
Stnxrt A<*fros«

B*rjMia»o

>>«-»
M.yiLW S Li I us
J

J r »<V*«

CfKK V ,V> A M I . s ^ y
j

| 0>vtwt«*l

l j N v w i » o C'v*iyo

List provxxrs nannHM

NA,WWCII»«JO P.OV«»S

***•>» u l f l l f f l _ 2 ~ , i U j U , _ J U l i . . t ? K t t V 0

[><Jt,'n.,,J>'*<*y Change |DXF«|^)»O SOC1K.HI 0 rf yO« d * * * fw$ btn

UlZNvL

UH»r*wtM». Stop t»f*n5 » K J 9*y\ M I I O txrttxn |

SECTION 0 . OCfflETiaAnV DXrMONANON
INnTRMttltONO* Ifttni? m * y im rfiftlrlcttwia on whom y m j m»y rl**»gn»>« • • yovf t>*t>«ftcl»fy. C»r#1ul»y t»»U U t t l o l k m l n g
information o n Etafwftciary D«sign«ik>n b « l o f « c o m p u t i n g tint t a c t i o n
A change of bowficiary will take effect <xi tf»o dato you tile a wrilteo r e c a s t with tl>e Retirement Office II tfxwo is (K> bonelicia/y
designation, or >f your beneficiary dons not survive yon ll»o tmoefits am paya<)to to l'>o surviving rwj*t of km of tt>o doceasod in ttve ordor
of procedence osiablist>od by tt>o UlaJi Unifonn Probato Codo
SPECIAL C O N D I T I O N S :
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEM: In tlw ovont a member rnanifn or remarries. ll»o rww spouso mil automatically bocooMJ tt>e
beneficiary unless a difforen! beneficiary loim is tiled with tl>o Retirement Ofhco on or after tl>o dato of marriage Tins provision apples
only to Hie vested contributions paid UJMJU tl»o death of (ho mornbor
I n f u r a n c * C o v a r a g e : II you a*e oow. or have boon mantod and rosidod. during that maniao/e. K» a statn tiavu>g cocnrnnruty pfoporty
l a * s . Providont life Insoranco Coinp<|'lV w*V lx* pfovonlotl Uotn c»ry»r^j oul tlm diroctKms ccxitairMxl «ri U*s roquost u^^ss tt»05« wrtxi
wore givon cofnmunity ptofHMly r»<)hts urvlof sirch law consent to OHS <hanyo ol lx>r>ol»ciary Nutxia. CaMcxnia. klal.o. lom5*aria.
Novada Mnw Moxico. Texas atxi Washn»glon a/e cornrmmily pfO|;Oily slafos lielof to your msmanco co<tifK:ato for OUKX ixovtuons
lhal apply to HKJ insurance boi>ofits of r»on rotuetJ mornbofS
PUOLIC SAFETY, JUDGES' A N D FIREFIGHTERS* R E I I R E M E N ! SYSTFMS:
spouse upon tl»o member s death

A iiiomiily benefit will bo auloffiabcally panJ lo Ihe

457 DEFERRED C O M P E N S A T I O N PLAN. No roslnct.ons apply
401(H) DEFERRED C O M P E N S A T I O N PLAN: In comptiaryce with UK) National ftfttiiwnmit Ecjuily Act ol 19B4. if you are maniod. youf
pnmary ber>eficiaiy MUST bo your spouso unless you pfovido us **itli a NOTARIZED mitten consonl frocn your spousa authonzing
a/K)tt>er benoficiaiy aod waj\nr>g any claim to tlw bonefits of ttws program
R « v o M n g any p f e v k w t nofiiinalk>nf of b^tv«fk:l^y, I h * f * b y d « t l g n » l « U>t folkrwlrvg p + f t o f ) ( t ) lo r t c « l v « « l l ' b # n « ( r U
psy»bim u p o n my d t a t f i . If I tfx>uk< dl« pf lor lo !!>• lk|uldBUon of my account, for tin* following p l * n t : (CAtcAf nil that typty.
If you W%h to 0tfiO7)0(« d/fterent D«n«f/c/A//#f for * # c / i p/«n. photocofrttn of f/)i« form may bi u * e d )
pCl A l pia«»s «i wf»di I arn (\»K^pAU>g

|

I R<H«OIIK3»H

L J 457 Duk)»ro<J Co»Tnrons-**on P^*>

l _ J ^Olfk) D o ^ r o O Convoo**fccn P\sn

Prtrnary Bgnoflctary(s)
i

Na/iKj

A(X>t»S (S*C«n. CKy. 5 ^ ) , Z«C»)

C

\
Secondary Btngflclafyji)

/

1 r^amo

J/'i/^

^JJLi^_A^-

i-L

AO0*o$a (Sfcod. City, S t * o . Z4>)

^d^Si^L

^)(\

L>

Btfftd**

>££LJL
Rol*Kjntl>o

/

Wfal

VCC.Co.

YQVfl «n?«AIUTTR 19 RliU\mi£D TO r t t Q W f l * Tllfft fX^TW

rjTmErMENT OfffCE USE:

U ^ ^ y ^ C

/

J

P^rr^m.ymUi^^

This i s t h e same document as R.42

MECf I

iOTT*

L
M**^ ^

A*)/

»Kr» 1^1

